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Abstract: It’s conceptually attractive to look for connection between performance, HRM and 
economic situation. How measure epiphenomenon’s impact when we can’t isolate that from 
global strategy? If casual relations maybe established, event can be interpreted in several 
ways (e.g. its chicken and egg situation…). This paper presents the results of a research on 
corporate performance measured by the creation of shareholder value. To do that we test 
empirically forced ranking’s performance versus all other classic human resource 
managements’ result first with a statistical comparison of share based on fortune 100 (from 
1996 to 2000); second with Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 value creation (from 1997 to 2000) 
with “Marakon Associates” (the growth between Market-to-book values ratio and the ROE 
spread (ROE – Cost of equity capital). 
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“HRM and Shareholders’ Value Creation” 
 
Before, a company eager to follow and ethical policy, by ensuring the maximum of 
stability with its  personnel, found the means of keeping a certain flexibility in the line with 
current trends. The solution then, in the USA, was the rule of the entered last first left; another 
rule in the fifties and sixties was the hoarding of labour but that is well far... Decade 90 saw 
developing in the USA Forced Ranking
1. This HRM was applied a lot. A Fortune article 
(2001) indicated that 25 percent of the Fortune 500 use some form of forced ranking
2. 
In order to improve performance management effectiveness, more and more 
companies are turning to forced ranking. Different from absolute rating approaches, where 
employees are assessed against defined standards and typically rated on a strict bell curve as 
“Top, meets, Bottom” expectations, a forced ranking process assesses employee performance 
relative to a peer group and often includes quotas or forced distribution of ratings (e.g., “C” 
10% low, “B” 80% middle, “A” 20% high). 
 
Insert Figure 1: Ranking Bell Curve 
 
During a McKinsey seminar (Holman and Jenkins, 2001: A19), only 16% of the 
managers consider to be able to distinguish, among their employees, the performant wage 
earner form the others. However according to Pfau & Kay (2001) traditional purposes of 
HRM can break up into four: 
(1)  Attract competences, 
(2)  Set up strategies to develop them, 
(3)  Mobilize them, 
(4)  Preserve only those which are necessary under constraints (legal, efficiencies and 
ethics).   2
In Human Capital Index European Survey 2002, the Human Resource Consulting Watson 
Wyatt asserts Great people management equals great shareholder value: European 
companies with the best human capital management deliver around twice as much 
shareholder value as their average competitors ( 89,6% of value added over 5 years)
3 ! He 
concludes that four practical HRM out of five are likely to create the stock exchange value: 
the recruiting of talents, an innovation strategy of reward, a framework of flexible and 
collegial work and the quality of communication. The 360-degree feedback
4, can be, as far as 
it is concerned, counter productive. Greene (1999) gives the intangibles ones of a firm for the 
investors. Five out of nine come under the field of HRM: the credibility of management; 
capacity to attract and hold back talents; capacity of innovation; the experiment of 
management; the logical systems of payment. 
  These statements would justify the use of forced ranking
5. If the ranking become 
popular it is also controversial. Indeed former General Electric chief Jack Welch is an 
enthusiastic supporter of forced ranking. For some CEO ranking is a panacea who is being 
adopted because senior leaders believe managers have not addresses performance problems or 
adequately developed their staffs’ talent. These leaders believe that ranking will help 
managers who are not doing their job raise the level of performance in their organizations; 
and for others this is a classic case of suboptimization because this is a tremendous drain on 
management time, a demotivating factor for he employees, and a loss for the economy as this 
affects these company stability to compete in the global market. 
  If the managerial speech confirms HR  primacy as for the performance of the 
organization, some methods employed have difficulties to convince even their own employees 
and the ranking seems to be part of them. According to Arcimoles and Saulquin (2002: 3), 
two assumptions are put forward:   3
 “1)  The  HRM of the leaders is not the employees’ one in the sense that a practice 
considered to be effective by the hierarchy can actually not exist or have negative effects. 
Leaders end employees are ultimately not talking about the same thing. 
 2)  The  HRM of the leaders supports the final economy performance, but not the 
“partnership” performance. Therefore HRM  is controlled by the hierarchy developing a 
reduce management badly accepted by the employees. 
  Consequently, whatever the explanation selected, the employees are not the “owners” 
of the RH policy anymore, and it is economical performance which is.” 
  Knowing that General Motors, General Electric, Ford,...have imposed forced ranking 
in their enterprises to reduce wage costs, it is impossible to say if the other firms adopted the 
management deliberately by strategic imitation or under the diktat of shareholders and the 
markets? Notwithstanding the arguments of an easy and continuous reduction wage costs, it is 
bring forward that the approval choice of ranking induces a high-performing culture. It is also 
difficult not to consider a relationship with Brockner’s thesis (1999) linking performance and 
level of insecurity or to evoke the fight against apathy (Bajoit, 1988) still see a managerial 
will to mask its strategy or its difficulties at the markets as with the competitors. 
  The service profit chain (Heskett and al., 1997; Le Louarn and Wils, 2001: 41-43) 
makes the assumption that stake holders’ satisfactions are interdependent. In other words, 
satisfied employees produce (i) in greater quantity of the service of better (ii) quality which 
increases (iii) customer’s satisfaction and therefore (iv) their faith fullness towards the firm. 
In fine, wage satisfaction would be a pledge of guarantee of value creation in terms of profit 
and growth. However, all things being equal in addition, if the causal chain exists when too 
many parameters are concerned, two reading of the relation are possible (Ryan and al., 1996; 
Koys2001): if the quality of the HRM is “correlated” with better performances, why good 
financial performances would not include a HRM of worth?   4
  Subsequently, why not conceive that the crisis, conjunctural mass layoffs and the 
demotivation in by-effect due to survivor sickness (Noer 1997; Brockner 1992) would break 
this virtuous circle and stem from a destruction of worth? Reciprocally, forced ranking
6 and 
its structural procession of lay-offs either credible but real threats, would less penalize the 
future performance than all other HRM? Is ranking an efficacious process in terms of Value 
Creation? 
  After having recalled in what forced ranking consists, the future of Value Creation 
will be initially analyzed with the model of “Marakon Associates” on the first hundred 
American companies for Fortune 100 (between 1996 and 2000). We will then compare the 
Value Creation of quoted value of the firms dimensioned with the index S&P 500 (from 1997 
to 2000). 
  The assumption that we test here is the existence of simultaneity between the stock 
exchange performance and the use of forced ranking (which the matter is the structural 
layoffs) when an economic slowdown occurs and asks for fast reductions of man power.  
On the contrary, when economic growth the best performance is obtained by the firms which 
use a classic HRM (e.g. the dismissals are purely conjunctural). Forced ranking HRM would 
thus induce negative effects (Kreps, 1996) capable of disturbing the managers at the time of 
their future recruitment. If some of the previous reports justify the use of forced ranking
7, we 
will note that the happiest working-bees execrate the employees without pity with the poor 
performers. 
  In the large contemporary companies, the professional amorality is transformed into 
economic morality (socially correct) and when the screw of system of control of performance 
is very tight, economic morality can even change into a social morality (Mintzberg 1990: 460-
61). It is necessary thus to think on the good interpretation of what said Milton Friedman   5
(1970) in a famous article “the Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits”. In 
other words, does the shareholder win with forced ranking HRM? 
  The choice of the period is being obvious on us because the record of all times, of 
mass lay-offs and the number of reduction in force in the USA goes back to 1998. This is why 
our report considers the contiguous years. The events of 2001 are an exogenous shock 
consider as too brutal and unpredictable so that a significant analysis can of it be drawn. 
 
Insert Table 1: Mass Lay-offs  
 
1.  Forced Ranking 
 
The contract of employment confers to the employees a capacity of control which gives 
him the right to evaluate the workers. Still it would be very reducing to bring back the validity 
of the criteria of evaluation to the only observation in general terms supposes a good control 
of the contextual variations that the attendants do not have necessarily. About Elton Mayo 
(1945: 79) asserts “the working group as a whole actually determined the output of individual 
workers by reference to a standard, predetermined but never clearly stated, that represented 
the group conception (rather than management’s) of a fair day’s work. This standard was 
rarely, if ever, in accord with the standards of the affiance engineers!” 
  Several authors propose that the purpose of downsizing is to reduce costs, improve 
efficiency, and reach a higher ratio of productivity to costs (Merry & Singer 1994: 37; Noer 
1997: 208). The new doctrine preaches Pay people Right linking intensity of the effort and 
level of the wages. To be done, there is the traditional distribution of stock-options (premiums 
given in event of “very good health” of company’s stock quotation)
8 but also the pay with the 
merit and threat of lay-offs (Saint-Onge, 2000; Schuster and al., 2000).   6
  The study of Joel Brockner (1992) tends to prove that in American firms, too much 
safety or of insecurity has a negative impact on the output. The optimum performance is 
obtained with a “moderate” but real insecurity level... 
 
Insert Figure 2: Performance and job security level 
 
The individual strategy reward/penalty would accelerate the revilement of performances 
owing to a credible treat (e.g. the structural lay-off). Forced ranking will also try to retain, 
thanks to premiums, the “strongest potentials” and get rid of the others. It is a way to mitigate 
uncertainty at the time of recruitment, to maintain the pressure as for the current output and to 
have a target ready to be laid off when an economics shock occurs. Only remains to establish 
the frequency and the criteria of evaluation to calculate and compare the levels of 
performance reached. 
  As for Holmström and Milgrom (1991), the output constitute only signal of the quality 
of the work done because exogenous elements to the representative agent can have an effect 
on the result (with the fall or the rise). In fine, for these authors, if the activity considered is 
multidimensional with results more observable than verifiable then the optimal contract is not 
a very sophisticated contract, mixed with simple diagrams of remuneration. 
  If the reward remains the main mean of stimulation used by the hierarchy to optimize 
the result, the punishment tends to rather becoming a more permanent and structural threat 
due to an unfavorable economic situation. 
  This management forces the working group to classify all the employees with an aim 
of accelerate the revelation of the productivity of each one. Consequently, this obligation will 
avoid the shareholder of the firm to fall into he skews underlined by Prendergast (1999)
9 
without loosing the benefit of 20% are retained by the payment of no-Claims bonus. The   7
means undergo the law of the market for the wages
10. The worst (5 to 15%) are requested to 
improve (up and out) or are returned forthwith (out and out)
11. 
  The polyvalence and the ease of use of forced ranking HRM did of them one of the 
most used methods evaluation wage in North America but its main quality is undoubtedly also 
its main failure (e.g. the subjectivity of the evaluation). Indeed, on the one hand, the objective 
criteria of evaluation are difficult to establish on the totality of deployed individual 
competences
12; in addition, the hierarchy lays down only the rules ‘of the game” to the sights 
of its particular objectives
13; finally, the relative classification will punish good but non 
excellent employees if they have misfortune to belong to a picked group (and conversely for 
the bad employees composing the worst group). Overall, if the results of certain activities are 
unobservable and if some tasks which may be substituted by another, the representative agent 
will firstly allocate its efforts towards elements remunerated to the detriment of more essential 
factors but not subsidized financially (less easily identifiable). The opponents with this HR 
management (for example Deming, 1986, moreover is an adept of Total Quality 
Management) assert that the variation of the performances are due to external factors rather 
than internal ones; that this management causes perverse effects and demotivation; that the 
individual evaluation by forced ranking HRM disturbs the collaboration and the diagnosis on 
the performance of the team. Indeed, the concept of achievement of the task prescribed in 
general terms suppose a good control of the contextual parameters… which is not inevitably 
the case when the activity has individually quantifiable results. A sabotage in reprisals of a 
perceived decision as unfair is always possible, but generally a minimum of wage co-
operation is established
14. However, the system reinforces the opportunities of collecting of 
the income formed by the cooperation within the team. Thus, the opportunist agent will be 
tempted to allot the merit of the common result to himself and will try to convince his 
superior to be the only one to obtain reward.   8
In fine, forced ranking HRM remains a good way of standardizing the lay-offs without 
incurring stock exchange sanction and while respecting the request for “socially correct”. The 
financial markets are thus satisfied not receiving signals of a bad management of the firm or 
of the decline of its outlets by the massive advertisement of massive lay-offs (Meschi 1996, 
1997). The ENRON example (followed of a bi-annual ranking out & out) is characteristic of 
this interpretation if it is considered that the markets could be deceived by a total absence of 
revealing signs of faintness.... 
Any decision of management creates or destroys value. But what do we mean by Value 
Creation? How can one measure the epiphenomenon’s impact HRM when we can’t isolate it 
from a global strategy group? If causal relation may be established, have we the right 
interpretation model (e.g. which of the hen or chicken...)? 
For  Arcimoles and Saulquin (2002), “three head ideas are in Value Creation: (i) the 
anticipation
15, (ii) the arbitration between output and risk
16, and finally (iii) the time factor
17.” 
(i)  Anticipation is possible only if we understand the systems of cause for 
purpose. However, the complexity of interactions between stakeholders 
induces many difficulties. The contingency of each situation appears when one 
tries to measure an effectiveness of work (e.g. it is dual in terms of (a) cost and 
productivity and (b) quality of the product manufactured). It is also difficult to 
reconcile the aspirations of the shareholder’s profit  
(ii)  And the desire of low cost of customers. The clause “all things being equal in 
addition” thus seems not easily justifiable as regards to economy of wok and 
HRM. 
(iii)  If many studies (Pfau and Kay 2001, Easton and Jarrell 1998, Becker and 
Gerhart 1996, Becker al. 1996, 1997, Huselid and al. 1997, Huselid 1995) 
support that certain decisions are creative of value and stock exchange pledges   9
of performance, Sire and Guilbbert (2002) breaks up the HR contribution of 
management to Value Creation in three axes: (1) the management of individual 
competences, (2) strategic management, (3) the satisfaction of external 
stakeholders’ expectations. They also underline the difficulties of measurement 
because three effects are simultaneous, integrated and interdependent. They 
thus warn against premature correlations (e.g. between output of a social policy 
and a stock exchange course or an economic profitability). As for the risk, it is 
often assimilated by the investors to the only financial weight of the wage bill 
whereas the obsolescent of competences, the difficulties of recruitment or the 
social conflicts are as important.  
(iv)  The research of the output / risk balance is also carrying contradictions: the 
logic of the long term cost and the effectiveness will encourage the 
organization to preserve the employees who produce efficiently; the one based 
on short terms and effectiveness will encourage to layoff the temporarily 
useless employees to reduce costs
18. 
  If a moderate policy of lay-offs makes it possible to fight against apathy, the 
detachment and fall of performance (Bajoit 1988, Brockner 1992)
19 can also induce 
mercenaries’ fickle behavior (Tiberghien 2001, Reichheld 1996). After the waves of lay-offs 
of the Nineties, the lost of the workers’ confidence in their employers was expressed by a 
refusal of their faithfulness towards the company in return of a more attractive remuneration 
(the risk of lay-offs being perceived like the same risk whatever the firm is).When the leader’s 
team is well provided in stock-options, the agency theory predicts that it will privilege the 
shareholders’ interest to the prejudice of the other stakeholders (Charreaux 1997, Desbrieres 
and al.2000, Perdreaux 2000, Wirtz 2002).   10
  Agency theory explains how to best organize the relationship between one party – the 
principal- who determines the work, and another party- the agent- who undertakes the work. 
Agency theory analyzes the cost of resolving two types of conflicts that can arise between 
principals and agents under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty: adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is the condition under which the principal 
cannot ascertain if the agent accurately represents his ability to do the work for which he is 
being paid. Moral hazard is the condition under which the principal cannot be sure if the agent 
has put forth maximal effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
  The incitement of the representative agent (manager) to act in the principal’s 
(shareholders) interest is here proportional to the importance of the premium expected in the 
event of “very good health” of company’s stock quotation. This is why stocks-options must 
represent an important part of the income working group. The financial aspect of the 
performance will be therefore put forward and any managerial decision will be related to the 
possible effect on the value of stock exchange (Copeland & al.2000). On the contrary, 
employees, the wages represent the indispensable or fundamental income and remain the main 
incentive because the amount of all distributed participations is completely additional. Thus, 
the hierarchy will seek other ways of incentive aiming at transforming the obligation of means 
(e.g. the attendance), reserved to the contract of employment in obligation of results. To be 
done it will link intensity of the effort and level of the wages (Cahuc and Zylberberg 1994, 
Troussier 1993,...Macleod and Malcomson 1993) before juxtaposing threat of dismissal.  
 
  To summarize, forced ranking HRM results from the current neo-institutionalist (neo-
hobbesian for Bowles 1985) and the theory of agency (in Williamson’s sense 1985). The 
malfeasance and the bounded rationality encourage the agents (employers or wage earner) to 
be withdrawn from their obligations as soon as the contract could not be written so that none   11
of both parties have to stake to transgress it. The logic use of ranking by a firm looks like a 
hobbesian analyze of state as a necessary form of coercion: the hierarchy of the organization 
is based on rules which force each one to respect its commitment and the HRM of the leaders 
thus aims only the final economic performance. Although the states of nature are exogenous 
with the contract of employment, they force nevertheless certain choices (e.g. a recession 
causes no desired lay-offs of the economic situation)... But will the empirical checks 
corroborate the theoretical analysis?  
 
2.  Empirical checking and findings discussion 
 
We will, in the first part, develop the methodology of the analysis with the index Fortune 
100 (2.1), then the one used with the S&P 500 (2.2). In both cases, for a transverse analysis, 
we could break down the results into 10 Sectors: 
 Sector  10:  Energy 
Sector 15: Heavy Industry and of transformation (Chemistry, Metallurgy, paper) 
Sector 20: Consumption goods and services. 
Sector 25: Durable goods, Hotel, Car, Media, Great distribution... 
Sector 30: Food, Drink, Drugstores 
Sector 40: Bank, Finance & Assurances 
Sector 45: IT (Soft & Hard). 
Sector 50:  Public Telecommunication  
Sector 55: Distribution, additional services and Industry 
 
2.1 With Fortune 100 
   12
Fortune 100 list comprises the hundred American most performant. They are classified 
with a weighting in term of profit, turnover, asset and market value. In this sample, it will be 
considered two groups: in the first one “classic HRM” (e.g. when mass lay-offs are 
conjunctural because economic slowdown) for the companies which do not use forced 
ranking HRM (this group is slightly majority 54,23 % over the period of 1996 to 2000); in the 
other one, the firms that practice “forced ranking HRM” (e.g. structural mass 
layoffs....biannual or annual). The research used the data of 142 firms over a five year period, 
to analyze the link between the Market-to-Book value ratio and the ROE spread (ROE-Cost 
of equity capital.) After reprocessing of the 671 observations (e.g. data), 542 will be 
completed and in conformity
20. The distribution in ten sectors is given in the table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2: Breakdown 
 
  Methodology 
 
One is place within the framework of the neo-classic financial theory with efficient markets 
hypothesis (e.g. capital flow depends on profitability related to risk) although independence 
between value of the firm and the financial structure is rejected. The method, used here, 
establishes for each company a fundamental relation between, on one hand, the market 
capitalization ratio
21 and the net book value (e.g. M/B= market capitalization / book equity 
also called “Marris ratio” which is the reverse of Book to Equity Ratio)
22; and on the other 
hand the capital efficiency (e.g. rc-ra or rc/ra; with (rc) expected return on equity and cost of 
capital (ra). “This type of model of Value Creation (e.g. “Strategic Planning Associates”, 
“Mac kinsey” or “Marakon associates”...)
23 was born in the USA in 1970, of the meting 
between research in financial theory..../.... and takeover bid of the years 1980 that made 
rediscover the roles of the shareholders in the strategy of company and of the activity of the 
cabinets of council on the subject (Hoarau 2000: 2)”. 
Market value of equity “M” indicates the value of the present and future potentialities of the 
firm whereas “B” estimates the value compared to the last strategies( the number of the 
invested resources before is regarded as the equivalent of the net book value) The 
measurement is not absolute but relative to a potential of Value Creation. Historically, Berk   13
(1995) observes the existence of a relation between profitability and B/M. He considers that 
that should not be regarded as an anomaly with the following thinking: 
(1) The value of the firm measures the last net book value  
(2) One supposes a strong correlation between the amount of the investments and the 
finance return on capital employed, 
(3)  The net book value of the firm should thus be strongly correlated with the amount of 
expected investments). 
The book value therefore constitutes a substitute to expected investments. Thus B/M ratio 
is substituted for the expected investment / market capitalization and becomes a better 
measurement of expected returns than only the market value of equity. Batteau and 
Lasgouttes (1997) establish that the division of market capitalization (“M”) by the constant 






Three situations appear: 
   (i)  M/B = 1; it is the status quo  
   (ii) M/B < 1; there is Value Creation (e.g. expected market rate of return (capital market 
equilibrium) is upper than WACC – weighted average cost of capital), 
   (iii) M/B<1; one notes a destruction of worth
25. 
Several Anglo-Saxon strategic models bind the M/B ratio and the connection (or the 
variation) between return on equity (rc)
26 and cost of capital (ra)
27. We will use the model of 
the group “Marakon Associates” which connects the index M/B and the ROE spread (ROE – 
Cost of equity capital, e.g. (rc-ra)) (Thietart, 1990: 152; Hoarau, 2000: 3 and s.). With regard 
to the past, creation / destruction of value is thus determined by the variation (rc-ra) whereas 
Marris ratio (M/B) indicates the performance anticipated by the investors. The market 
estimates that four situations (classified more desirable with the least enviable) thus arise (cf. 
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[1] The Excellence: M/B > 1 and rc-ra > 0 (there is Value Creation with a return capital 
higher to cost of capital). The investors consider that these enterprises will maintain in the 
future their good past performances. 
[2] The Revitalization: M/B > 1 and rc-ra < 0 (there is Value Creation although the cost 
of capital is higher than capital efficiency). The future performances are higher than those 
obtained before. 
[3] The Decline: M/B< 1 and rc-ra < 0 (there is Value Destruction with cost    
effectiveness).The good former performances are on the decline. 
[4] The Pitfall: M/B<1 and rc-ra > 0 (There is Value Destruction with return on capital 
higher than cost of capital). For the markets, these firms will not be able to improve in the 
future their poor past performances. 
 
Insert Figure 3: Marakon and Associates Model  
 
“Fortune 100”
28 annually classifies the first hundred Americans groups by their 
weighted performance in terms of turnover, profit, asset and market value. That will be used 
as a list of reference to the study. Between 1996 and 2000, with the merging, acquisitions and 
bankruptcies game, 150 different companies integrated this index at least a year (142 provided 
to Forbes insufficient data for the analysis of Value Creation using the Marakon Associates 
model) 
We will proceed to the calculations of “M/B” Marris ratio and the “rc-ra” of each 
company, year by year, then to the averages and standard deviations from the whole list, the 
classic HRM and FR group. We will proceed to a Pearson correlation test in the search of a 
curve of tendency starting from a linear regression of order 1, y = a*x +b +u (relation 3), with   15
y =M/B; x= (rc-ra); (a) is the coefficient associated with the variable explanatory x; (b) the 
constant model and (u): the remnant
29. 
 
   Results 
 
The M/B ratio of all the sample is included between [0,0205; 10,30]. There is an 
average of 1,176 and a standard deviation of 1,66. The differential (rc-ra) lies between [-
0,0559; 0,1869]. It is as an average of-0,01 and a standard deviation of 0,05. The M/B ratio is 
more break up compared to its average (rc-ra) but on a whole, the values including the 
extremes are completely similar.  
 
Insert Table 3 ROE and Marris ratio 
 
  Pearson correlation test 
 
After having tested the nullity of the Pearson correlation coefficient on the sampling (r [-1; 1]) 
which reflects the degree of linearity between the data M/B and (rc-ra), we reject the 
assumption of nullity of r under a threshold of 5%. There is indeed a correlation between M/B 
and (rc-ra) the coefficient which is associated is 0,7505 on the totality of the sample (0,8649 
for the classic HRM group and 0,7055 for the FR group). The correlation is possible, thus the 
high values of the M/B series is associated to high values of (rc-ra) and conversely. 
 
  Search of tendency curve 
Linear regressions of M/B on (rc-ra) have as equations
30: 
M/B with classic HRM = 31,12 (rc-ra)  + 1,5 + u          Relation 3 (with an r
2= 0,75) 
M/B with ranking HRM = 32,36 (rc-ra) + 1+ u            Relation 4 (with an r
2 = 0,72)   16
Which u is a remnant. 
 
If the polynomial of the second order is calculated, one will obtain an r
2 lower than the 
one before (e.g. r
2  = 0,57 instead of an r
2 > 0,7). It is therefore useless to continue the 
regression. Notice that the r
2 are very high for an econometric study (e.g. compared to the 
other university work or completed by consultants... Hoarau 2000: 15). The explanation is due 
undoubtedly to the fact that the studied sample considers the 100 best American groups. 
However, a reprocessing of the countable asset (B) seems to be necessary. Indeed, the axis 
Excellent/Pitfall certainly indicates bad immaterial assets (although Chung and Pruitt 1994 
studies have considered the weakness of bias when the only balance-sheet results are used) 
Figure 4 (afterward) respectively represents the Marakon Associates’ model (applied 
to fortune 100 company list from 1997 to 2000) for the classic HRM samples and forced 
ranking HRM. It shows curves of completely similar tendencies (e.g. almost parallel). With all 
542 data we obtain
31: 
 
Insert Table 4 Classic HRM sample group 
 
Insert Table 5 Forced Ranking HRM sample group 
 
Insert Figure 4: Marakon and Associates Model for Fortune 100 company list 
 
It is noted that companies using forced ranking HRM absorb well the crisis and the 
peak of lay-off of 1998 since the number of firms in the Excellence category grow from 1996 
until 1999 before falling of 27 % in 2000. Reciprocally for the classic HRM the number of 
firms in the Excellent category starts by falling of 9,1% in 1998 (adjustment with delayed-
action of the wage bill) to set out again with the rise of 17,2 in 1999 while stabilizing in 2000.   17
Therefore, it seems that the structural mass lay-offs is more adapted when an economic 
slowdown occurs and asks for fast reductions of manpower. At the contrary, when economic 
growth the best performances seem to be obtained by the firms using a classic HRM (e.g. 
where lay-offs are simply conjunctural). 
 
  Evolution of the number of employees 
 
One attends a progression of 11,3 % of the number of employees for the classic HRM 
versus 2% for forced ranking HRM group. 
 
Insert Table 6: Number of Wage Earner Posts 
 
That could also validate the assumption that forced ranking HRM induces a negative 
reputation (Kreps, 1996) susceptible of bothering managers at the time of their future 
recruitments. Indeed, at the time of an economic revival, the future employees will choose the 
company preferably managed with least aggressive possible HRM (e.g. classic rather than 
rank & yank), which will handicap the recruitments and therefore the productivity of the 
sample of firms’ forced ranking HRM. In other words, the reactivity, permitted by structural 
lay-offs and profits in term of quoted Value Creation caused by the absence of advertisement 
of mass lay-offs (because the markets are there now risk-adverse
32, do not compensate, at the 
time of a revival of activity, the difficulty of recruiting again personal. 
. 
2.2 Standard & Poor 
 
In order to validate our first results, we now will test our assumption, crosswise and 
longitudinally (1996-2000), on a more extensive sample, the S & P 500. Does a simultaneity   18
exist between stock exchange performance and forced ranking (e.g. with structural mass lay-
offs) when an economic slowdown occurs and ask for fast reductions of manpower? On the 
contrary, when economic growth are the best performances obtained by the firms which use a 
classic HRM (e.g. where lay-offs are simply conjunctural)? In other words, does forced 
ranking HRM create more value added for the shareholder than the other HRM? 
 
   Methodology 
 
Our next choice is the analysis of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500
33 index and we bear it 
because:  
a)  500 is a sufficiently high number of values to analyze two significant group of firms 
(one using forced ranking HRM 20% and the other classic HRM 80%) 
b)  The sectorial cover of the 500 American companies which compose it is broad. 
c)  The five hundred values represent firms (often leaders on the market) which the 
technostructure is sufficiently important for an installation of systems of wage 
performance evaluation whatever they are. 
d)  The financial activity around the index is important 
e)  The index composition is stable
34 and the methodology employed for its evaluation is 
explicit (www.advisorinsght.com/pub/indexes/guidelin.htm). 
f)  Moreover, the quoted value of all the actions is easily found (and free) on Internet 
(Yahoo.fr heading finance), the most interesting being to obtain adjusted quotations 
according to the splits, dividends, acquisition-fusion-sale “free” bonus shares 
distribution.... with a constant and coherent methodology. 
 
The total of the raw data is of 513 firms (21.25% practicing the FR). The minimum of 
significant data (at least 3 years, 1997, 1998 ”meaningful” year & 1999, over the 5 planned )   19
is obtained with 453 firms, of which 89 ( whether 19.65%) use the forced ranking HRM and 
364 (80,35%) adopted another mode of GRH. 
 
  On the one hand, the raw data of the panel considered are 513. Values entered the 
index, other left for bankrupt reason such as ENRON, or amalgamated or were repurchased: 
Polaroïd, AMOCO, Data general, Digital equipment, GTE, MOBIL, Mcdonnel Douglas, 
Seagate, Texaco, Tricon Global Restaurants, Union Carbide, and Westinghouse electric. 
 
Insert Table 7: Sectorial distribution of two groups 
 
We note that forced ranking HRM is relatively uniformly distributed in the S&P 500 
with a representation a little more pronounced in sectors 20 and 45. The sectors 25 to 40 
prefer, as for them, a more traditional management. Let us advance the assumption of a 
stronger anchoring in the practices of management for the durable goods 25 and financial 
services 40 (e.g. must one change a usual management which works well), whereas the 
corporate culture is less definite in the services 20 and the new technologies 45 because of the 
recent developments and changes which they known. 
 
  Longitudinal analysis 
 
On the whole, the stock exchange performance of the sample of the 89 firms using 
forced ranking HRM management perform better the ones of the 364 classic HRM firms until 
1998 (of 3% for 1996 and 1997; of 7,5% for 1998, an invert tendency in 1999 with -3%...). 
From 1998 the analysis is exogenously complicated by an enormous increase (standard 
deviation) in Stock Exchange. One of the explanations holds in the bursting of bubble 
internet, all the technological values overvalued strongly will drop with them all the markets.   20
Another is the entry in the recession. However, the performances of forced ranking HRM are 
more homogeneous  
 
Insert Table 8: Standard deviations 
 
The variation in standard deviations show that the crisis affects in very different ways each of 
the companies belonging to the S&P 500. 
 
  Transversal Analysis 
 
The results will indeed show huge disparities. The sample forced ranking HRM 
perform better than classic HRM until 1998, before a violent one inversion of tendency. In 
less than 2 years, the classic HRM sample not content to perform better, makes up with its lost 
time and takes even a good advance. At the exception of heavy industry (sect.15) where 
continue profits of productivity with stable markets calls for anticipated recurrent lay-offs 
(e.g. the essence of forced ranking HRM).  
 
Insert Table 9: The Results 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
On Fortune 100 and S&P 500 index, there is on average almost no difference in the 
Stock-Exchange Value Creation between 1996 and 2000, when the firms used HRM forced 
ranking or a classic HRM. Let us note however that if forced ranking confirms that it is well 
adapted to the sector 15 (heavy industry cumulating foreseeable of the outlets and the profits 
of productivity), no other significant difference is noted for the remainder of the economy.   21
That confirms, as a need, therefore that forced ranking is not a “miraculous” management ! 
We could also add to the sight of the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom both followers of 
the forced ranking that the HRM exacerbate the opportunism of the executive-level managers 
which wants to dissimulate instabilities, endogenous or exogenous, in Value Creation of their 
firms in order to continue to increase theirs stock-options’ value. 
  On the other hand, at the time of an economic slow down, the analysis longitudinal of 
the average performances of the two groups shows a correlation between the use of ranking 
and higher Value Creation. Indeed, the ranking HRM makes it possible to adjust very quickly 
their workforce with the economic situation. Conversely at the time of a recovery, the classic 
HRM appears to be the most performant. The best conceivable explanation is to consider that 
company’s reputation produces negative effects on recruiting when ranking HRM it is used 
and when economic fast growth back. Indeed, the happiest working-bees execrate the 
employees without pity with poor performers. Therefore, when the employees have the 
choice, they prefer to be engage by firms which a painless HRM (e.g. a least aggressive as 
possible). Our assumption is thus corroborated what ever the method of analysis of 
performance. The investors when they have the feeling of the return of the growth, should 
therefore invest in the firms which manage with a classic HR, and when they believe in 
slowdown of the economy in the firms which use forced ranking, forced choice or similar 
HRM methods. 
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Figure 4: Marakon and Associates Model for Fortune 100 company list  
With 542 observations’ “fortune 100” from 1996 to 2000. 
▬ ▬ ▬ ▬ and  Ο  331 Firms with “classic HRM” 61,07% 
▬▬▬▬▬ and  □  211 Firms with “forced ranking HRM” 38,93% 
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Table 1: Mass Lay-offs 
Year  Real Lay-offs   Lay-offs announced   Number of mass lay-offs 
1996 1184355  957745 5697 
1997 1146115  1041907 5683 
1998  1227573 1232384 5851 
1999 1149267  972244 5675 
2000 1170427  1018700 5620 
2001 1751187  1612923 8350 
rc-ra   28
 
Table 2: Breakdown 
Sectors  Firms with classic HRM  % classic  Firms with Forced ranking HRM  % ranking 
10 2  2,60 7  10,77 
15 2  2,60 2  3,08 
20 5  6,49 10  15,38 
25 3  3,90 10  15,38 
30 12  15,58  3  4,62 
35 8  10,39  6  9,23 
40 35  45,45  6  9,23 
45 1  1,30 13  20,00 
50 6  7,79 7  10,77 
55 3  3,90 1  1,54 
Total 77  100%  65  100% 
 54,23%    45,77%   
 
Table 3: ROE and Marris ratio 
  rc-ra Classic HRM r c-ra Ranking HRM  M/B Classic HRM M/B  Ranking HRM 
Min  -0,056 (Equitable 
Cos. 1997) 
-0,055  0,021 (Salomon 
1996) 
0,086 (Locked Martin 
1996) 




10,30 (Coca cola 
1998) 
10,89 (Scherng Plough 
1999) 
Moy.  -0,0109 0,0077  1,156 1,563 
  Moy. -0,0036  Moy 1,316 
S-dev.  0,05 0,06  1,66 3,60 
 
Table 4: Classic HRM sample group 
  Classic HRM  1996 % 1997 %  1998 % 1999 %  2000  % 
Excellence    97        29,3%  19 28 22 30 18 27,3 20 32  18  31
Revitalization    19          5,8%  2 32 2 , 55 7,6 5 8  5  8
Pitfall  206        62,2%  43 62 48 65 42 63,6 38 60  35  59
Decline      9          2,7%  5 72 2 , 51 1,5 0 0  1  2
Total  331        100 %  69 100 74 100 66 100 63 100  59  100
   29
Table 5: (Forced) Ranking sample group 
  Ranking HRM  1996 % 1997 %  1998 % 1999 %  2000  % 
Excellence   84         39,8%  14 36 19 40 19 43 19 45  13  33
Revitalization   14           6,6%  2 55 1 1 4 91 2   2  5
Pitfall   95         45%  20 51 17 36 16 36 20 48  22  56
Decline   18           8,6%  3 86 1 3 5 11 2 5  2  5
Total  211        100 %  39 100 47 100 44 100 42 100  39  100
 
Table 6: Number of wage earner posts 
  Wage-earners managed with classic HRM  Wage-earners managed with Forced ranking HRM 
1997  4368.9 5953,4 
1998  4758.8 6134,6 
1999  4944,6 6316,6 
2000  4922,7 6063,1 
  Thousands Thousands 
 
Table 7: Sectorial distribution of two groups 
  Forced ranking HRM 
% group1        Number
                  Classic HRM 
Adjusted Number              % group 2 
with group 1                       Total 364 
Gap between 
group 1 and 
adjusted 2 
%total sector 10  0,056  5 4,361 0,049  No significant
%total sector 15  0,067  6 6,141 0,069  No significant
%total sector 20  0,169  15 11,748 0,132  + 3
%total sector 25  0,146  13 17,355 0,195  - 4
%total sector 30  0,079  7 6,141 0,069  + 1
%total sector 35  0,09  8 8,099 0,091  No significant
%total sector 40 0,067  6 15,13 0,17  - 9
%total sector 45  0,225  20 12,46 0,14  + 8
%total sector 50  0,022  2 1,691 0,019  No significant
%total sector 55  0,079  7 5,874 0,066  + 1
Total firms     453  100%  89 89 100%  0
   30
Table 8: Standard deviations 
 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Standard deviation’s forced ranking HRM   0.2697  0.1359  0.3954  0.3218  0.0980 
standard deviation’s total  0.2692  0.1575  0.6096  1.1578  0.1883 
Standard deviation’s classic HRM 0.2705  0.1630  0.6621  1.363  0.1958 
 
Table 9: The Results 
Sect.  FR 96  NFR 96  FR 97  NFR 97  FR 98  NFR 98  FR 99  NFR 99  FR 00  NFR 00 
10  0,31261 0,45949 0,02077 0,12369 -0,0961  -0,325  0,22923 0,51745 0,19247 0,51023 
Firms’ stocks with forced ranking HRM perform better ↑ to 1998, then downturn after ↓ 
15  0,21155 0,0344  0,10526 0,05878 -0,0812  -0,0262  0,15873 0,08622 -0,0468  -0,0602 
Firms’ stocks with forced ranking HRM always perform better 
20  0,25818 0,25984 0,18963 0,34244 -0,0288  0,15509 0,09419 -0,1312  0,13156 0,28095 
Firms’ stocks with forced ranking HRM perform better ↑ to 1997, then downturn after ↓ 
25  0,17294 0,24951 0,37588 0,45718 0,24595 0,38202 0,02319 -0,021  -0,0602  0,24923 
Firms’ stocks with forced ranking HRM perform better ↑ to 1996, then downturn after ↓ 
30  0,39252 0,25269 0,40819 0,31244 0,23334 0,22405 -0,1015  -0,224  0,03232 0,27217 
Firms’ stocks with forced ranking HRM perform better ↑ to 1998, then downturn after ↓ 
35  0,24703 0,1063  0,40346 0,30165 0,34763 0,35955 -0,0759  0,08366 0,151  0,44026 
There is equality from 1996 to 1997, then Forced ranking HRM perform better ↑ in 1998, then downturn after ↓ 
from 199 to 2000 
40  0,45594 0,41147 0,43675 0,45043 0,57617 0,12277 0,13658 -0,0803  0,21011 0,39855 
Le forced ranking HRM perform better ↑ to 1999, then downturn after ↓ 
45  0,60191 0,67232 0,52121 0,1909  1,07354 0,94335 0,68484 1,46714 -0,2078  0,11878 
Firms’ stocks with forced ranking HRM perform better ↑ to 1998, then downturn after ↓. 
50  -0,187  0,0055  0,47473 0,43646 0,46619 0,41298 -0,0354  0,64317 -0,3127  -0,1959 
There is equality from 1997 to 1999, then Forced ranking HRM downturn strongly after ↓. 
55  0,26634  0,13005  0,2882 0,1569 0,0832 0,14508  0,09578  0,13645  0,10621  0,5355 
Firms’ stocks with forced ranking HRM perform better ↑ to 1998, then downturn after ↓.   31
   FOOTNOTES 
                                                            
1 See also Pfeffer 1997, 1998; Rynes & Gerhart 2000; Brown & al. 2000; Chingos 2002. 
2 Matthew Boyle, Performance Reviews: Perilous Curves Ahead. Fortune Magazine, May 28, 2001. 
3 www.peoplesoft.com/corp/en/ent_stra/articles/watsonwyatt.asp et.... /articles/hcm.asp. 
4 The 360 degree feedback (or Multi-Rater Assessments) is a tool for appraisal evaluation. It needs to know 
how others view our work but we want the information in a kind and gentle fashion. This multi-source 
feedback method provides a comprehensive perspective of employee performance by utilizing feedback 
from the full circle of people with whom the employee interacts: supervisors, subordinates and co-workers. 
It allows has a manager to compare his own evaluation of an employee with the perception of his 
entourage. The appraisal preparation form consists from 40 to 120 questions. 180 degree is the same but 
restrained and the 540 degree implies also customers and suppliers. Those points of view are confronted 
and synthesized. 
5 Alias top grading, rank and yank, forced choice or forced distribution. 
6 “The performance appraisal is a process that identifies, evaluates, and develops employees’ performance 
to meet employees and organisational goals (Dessler 2000: 152).” 
7 Alias top grading, rank and yank, forced choice or forced distribution. 
8 A stock option is an option in which the underlying security is the common stock of a corporation, giving 
the holder the right to buy or sell its stock at a specified price by a specific date. Also, it is a method of 
employee compensation that gives workers the right to buy the company's stock during a specified period 
of time at a stipulated exercise price. 
9 The principal generally appreciates, on the on hand, the effort according to a simple standard which leads 
to a weak dispersion of the judgments (“centrality bias or similar bias”), and in addition, the poor 
performances which will be overestimated because it is more pleasant to reward an agent than to punish it 
(“leniency bias or average rating error”). The principal may also judge with inadequate information, halo 
effect (e.g. tendency to appraise all aspects of behavior or character on the basis of a single attribute) or 
constant and systematic bias. 
10 For Ford the high performer employees (A) are 10%, the intermediates (B) 75% and the “under-
performants” or poor performers (C) 15%. 
11 They are two different logic of elimination forced. Most current is relative, x% of paid most badly 
classified are laid off whatever their absolute performance. The other is absolute compared to the minima 
fixed by the superior and only those which do not exceed this threshold are laid off. In the event of 
reduction of manpower of the economic situation, their destiny is common: most badly classified will be 
always left first! 
12 Moreover, if an ordinal classification of the first to the last employee is carried out without prohibitory 
cost, how has one to compare the performance of a white-collar and that of a blue-collar worker however 
both necessary to the good function of the company?   32
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 American firms are the subject of proceedings for discrimination because the forced ranking HRM would 
have been directed unfavorably against unquestionable categories of employees: Old, minority, women... 
Ford for example was condemned to 10 million dollars for 530 paid 
(www.bonforums.com/discrimination/), for GM, Conoco, Microsoft, Akron....the legal proceedings are 
taking place. 
14 Although within the firm two dynamic behavioral contradictions cohabits (for example; the individual 
sense of responsibility can appear paradoxical with solidarity in the team work) co-operation 
methodological individualism (within the meaning of Meschi 1996:87) emerges 
15 Only is taken into account the output awaited by the investors and not that noted 
16 At a financial level, a decision of management is compromised between the hoped output and risks it 
perceived. 
17 Indeed, a contradiction can appear between the short and long term. 
18 Advertisement of lay-offs perhaps perceived differently (1) It is defensive when the leader’s lack of 
foresight leader (and/or the institutional framework) incite reorganizations with a delayed-action and from a 
point of view of short term. The investors are very risk-adverse with the strikes and the overexposure in 
media of usual social conflicts on the matters (2). At the contrary, the suppressions of employments 
realized of the expectation of a decline of the productivity are offensive actions accepted better by markets, 
across the Atlantic in particular (Hubler and al.2001, 1998...) 
19 For Thevenet and Neveu (2002) the motivation in an employment varies in 4 sentences: (1) the training 
(6 months to 1 year), (2) the maximum implication (2 at 3 years), (3) the implication/detachment 
(installation in the routine during 1 to 2 years), (4) the detachment (or “officialization”) with a minimum 
service (1 year or more) and lower performances. 
20 The sector 45 IT (Soft & Hard) was removed because 13,5 of the companies on 14 manage with forced 
ranking while creating value enormously, which disequilibria out model (e.g. Applied Material, Cisco, 
Compaq, Dell, EDS, HP, Intel, IBM, Oracle, Microsoft, Sun Micro, Texas Instrument, Xerox; only 3M 
does not use in all its divisions the rank & yank). 
21 Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying stock price by the number of shares outstanding. 
22 Fama & French (1992, 1993, 1995) shows that the M/B ratio has an explanatory factor of probabilities of 
actions superior to “BETA” of the MEDAF, on the American market. They show in 1995 that a high M/B 
ratio results in weak profits (and vice versa) and a certain financial vulnerability on the firms (or an 
overreaction of the investors). 
23 e.g. the model of the Strategic Planning Associates and that of Mac Kinsey formalized starting from 
work of Fruhan (1979) will not be used here 
24 CF is the shareholders’ returns on day t = (1, 2,..., N) and E(r)
t is expected rate of return related to risk. 
25 “A dollar invested today in the company of which the M/B ratio>1 creates more value than a dollar 
invested in the company with M/B<1. The companies which create value release a profitability of capital 
higher than the one required by the shareholder (e.g. the capital cost). Those which do not satisfy this   33
                                                                                                                                                                                           
minimum profitability destroy value and see their quoted value being adjusted on the level which makes it 
possible to obtain whatever the book equity (Hoarau 2000:3).” 
26 Return on equity(rc) = (net attributable profit/net book value) 
27 The capital stock own was calculated on the arithmetic means of 48 sectors starting from the MEDAF 
(for a recall of the assumptions Hoarau 2000: 7-8) over 5 years for the year 1990 (Fama & French 1997: 
173 or Bancel & Ceddaha 1999: 75). 
28 www. forbes.com 
29 And as a need a quadratic polynomial is a polynomial of degree 2: y = a*x
2 + b*x + c + u with y = M/B; 
x = (rc-ra); a: the coefficient associated with the explanatory variable x
2; b: the coefficient associated with 
the explanatory variable x, c: the constant of the model and u: the remnant.  
30 M/B classic HRM = 29,991 (rc-ra) + 1,492 + u (with an r
2 = 0,7305), M/B ranking HRM = 38,765 (rc-ra) 
+ 1,622 + u (with an r
2 = 0,4627) without any withdrawal of data (631 observations) 
31 For memory the 67 data of sample group take away and concerning the sector 45 “IT” showed 
Excellence 60, Revitalization 1; Pitfall 3; Decline3. Al these companies have a Marris ratio higher to 4. 
32 Meschi 1996,1997; Watson Wyatt 2002 and the study of Mercer Consulting (800 American firms in 35 
sectors) show that the companies which lay-off with all will reduce the costs see their Stock Exchange 
quotations progressing of 16 % against 26% for the other companies. The Stock Market thus is less and less 
convinced by the companies which are based on strategies lay-offs to increase their benefits 
33 For the index composition cf.www.mobydata.com/comp/spx.htm). 
34 From his creation in 1926 until the 15/08/2000, 101 firms have integrated 
www.spglobal.com/GeneralCriteria.pdf.. 